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ABSTRACT 
Bargaining, Mergers, and Technology Choice in Bilaterally Oligopolistic 
Industries 
by Roman Inderst and Christian Wey 
This paper provides a conceptual framework of multilateral bargaining in a bilaterally 
oligopolistic industry to analyze the motivations for horizontal mergers, technology 
choice, and their welfare implications. We first analyze the implication of market 
structure for the distribution of industry profits. We find that retailer mergers are more 
likely (less likely) if suppliers have increasing (decreasing) unit costs, while supplier 
mergers are more likely (less likely) if goods are substitutes (complements). In a second 
step we explore how market structure affects suppliers' technology choice, which 
reflects a trade-off between inframarginal and marginal production costs. We find that 
suppliers focus more on marginal cost reduction if (i) retailers are integrated and (ii) 
suppliers are non-integrated. 
 
In a final step we consider the whole picture where both market structure and 
(subsequent) technology choice are endogenous. Analyzing the equilibrium market 
structure, we find cases where retailers become integrated to induce suppliers to choose 
a more efficient technology, even though integration weakens their bargaining position. 
In this case the merger benefits all parties, i.e., suppliers, retailers, and even consumers. 
However, we also show that the equilibrium market structure does often not maximize 
welfare. 
 
Keywords: Bilateral Oligopoly, Antitrust, Bargaining Power, Merger, Retailing, Technology 
Choice 
JEL Classification: D40, L10, L40 
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ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Verhandlungen, Fusionen und Technologiewahl in bilateralen Oligopolen 
Diese Arbeit entwickelt einen Modellrahmen für multilaterale Verhandlungen in 
bilateralen Oligopolen, um die Fusions- und Technologiewahlanreize der Unternehmen 
sowie deren Wohlfahrtswirkungen zu untersuchen. Der wichtigste Anwendungsbereich 
des Modells sind die Firmenbeziehungen zwischen Einzelhandelsketten und 
Herstellerfirmen. Beide Handelsstufen sind weder vollkommen monopolisiert noch 
perfekt fragmentiert. Vielmehr stehen auf jeder Handelsstufe wenige große Firmen 
miteinander in Konkurrenz. Die Geschäftbeziehungen zwischen Herstellern und 
Einzelhandel sind zu dem multilateral angelegt, so daß ein Hersteller seine Produkte 
typischerweise an mehrere Einzelhandelsketten verkauft und Unternehmen des 
Einzelhandels mehrere Herstellermarken anbieten. 
 
Der Aufsatz analysiert zuerst, wie die Marktstruktur die Verteilung der Industrieprofite 
zwischen den Firmen bestimmt, woraus sich eindeutige Bedingungen für profitable 
Zusammenschlüsse ableiten lassen: Firmen des Einzelhandels stellen sich durch einen 
Zusammenschluß besser (schlechter), wenn die Herstellerfirmen mit steigenden 
(fallenden) Durchschnittskosten produzieren. Herstellerfirmen profitieren durch einen 
Zusammenschluß, wenn sie substituierbare Güter anbieten, während sie sich durch eine 
Fusion schlechter stellen, wenn sie komplementäre Güter absetzen. 
 
Der nächste Schritt der Untersuchung erkundet die Wirkungen der Marktstruktur auf die 
Technologiewahlanreize der Hersteller, wobei die Adaption einer neuen Technologie 
einerseits mit niedrigeren marginalen Kosten und andererseits mit höheren 
inframarginalen (oder Fix-) Kosten einhergeht. Es zeigt sich, daß Herstellerfirmen 
höhere Anreize zur Senkung ihrer marginalen Kosten haben, wenn (i) der Einzelhandel 
vollständig monopolisiert ist und (ii) die Herstellerfirmen nicht integriert sind. 
 
Die Untersuchung stellt damit die aktuellen Konzentrationsprozesse im Einzelhandel in 
ein neues Licht. Zusammenschlüsse zwischen Einzelhändlern führen dazu, daß 
Hersteller einen relativ höheren Anteil ihrer marginalen Kosten tragen müssen, was 
wiederum die Anreizen zur Verringerung derselben vergrößert. Dieses Ergebnis steht in 
einem scharfen Gegensatz zu der häufig geäußerten Hypothese, daß mächtige 
Einzelhandelsketten die Gewinne der Herstellerfirmen schmälern und folglich die 
Innovationstätigkeit im Produktionssektor nachhaltig beeinträchtigen. 
 
In dem letzen Schritt der Untersuchung werden die Marktstruktur und die nachfolgende 
Technologiewahl der Herstellerfirmen endogen bestimmt. Die Analyse der 
gleichgewichtigen Marktstruktur bei endogener Technologiewahl fördert die 
Möglichkeit strategischer Fusionen zwischen Einzelhandelsfirmen zu Tage. In diesem 
Fall schließen sich zwei Einzelhändler zusammen, um die Herstellerfirmen zur Wahl 
der effizienten Technologie zu bewegen, obwohl die Einzelhändler durch die Fusion 
ihre Verhandlungsposition gegenüber den Herstellern schwächen. Interessanterweise 
 v 
stellen sich durch strategische Einzelhandelsfusionen alle Marktpartizipanten besser: 
die Hersteller, der Einzelhandel und die Konsumenten. Es zeigt sich allerdings auch, 
daß die endogen bestimmte Marktstruktur nicht immer die Wohlfahrt maximiert. 
 
Schlagwörter: Bilaterales Oligopol, Wettbewerbspolitik, Verhandlungsmacht, Fusionen, 
Einzelhandel, Technologiewahl 
 vi 
 
 
1 Introduction
Supply contracts in markets for intermediate goods are often negotiated. An important
example are contracts between producers and retailers. Moreover, it is rather exceptional
that either the upstream market side or the downstream market side is fully integrated.
Instead, a given producer typically supplies many independent retailers, while a given
retailer sells products of many diﬀerent suppliers. Despite its prevalence, bilaterally
oligopolistic markets with negotiated supply contracts have been largely ignored in the
literature.1
This paper develops a model of multilateral bargaining in a bilaterally oligopolistic
setting. In equilibrium each retailer sells all brands, while each producer supplies to
all retailers. We subsequently use this model to study two related questions. First,
we investigate the incentives for horizontal mergers. Second, we analyze how market
structure aﬀects technology choice by suppliers.
Precisely, our set-up is as follows. For the main part we assume that demand at both
retailers is independent. This allows us to abstract from monopolization eﬀects on the
Þnal market when investigating the incentives for horizontal mergers. Our bargaining
concept contains two major ingredients. First, we assume that bargaining is eﬃcient
as the two sides can write non-linear supply contracts. This seems reasonable for the
case where retailers procure their supply via bilateral negotiations and not via a market
interface. Second, we assume that bargaining between all parties proceeds simultane-
ously, which deprives any party of a Þrst-mover advantage. Applying this framework,
we proceed in three steps. We Þrst analyze equilibrium market structure when mergers
only aﬀect the distribution of industry proÞts. In a second step we introduce (non-
contractible) technology choice by suppliers and investigate how this is aﬀected by the
market structure. Finally, we complete the picture and analyze the case where both
market structure and technology choices are endogenous.
Focusing on the impact of market structure on the distribution of rents, we derive
exact conditions under which suppliers or retailers prefer to become integrated. One
implication will be that retailers prefer to merge if the production technologies exhibit
strictly increasing unit costs. If suppliers have strictly decreasing unit costs, retailers
prefer to stay non-integrated. By aﬀecting the distribution of industry proÞts, the mar-
1The standard way to model imperfectly competitive input markets is to consider a two-stage market
game in which upstream Þrms compete as Stackelberg leaders via wholesale prices (see, e.g., Waterson
(1980), Salinger (1988), and Kühn and Vives (1999)). In a similar fashion, the literature on vertical
agreements typically assumes that suppliers, that are few in numbers, have suﬃcient market power to
impose contractual obligations on powerless retailers (see, e.g., recent work by Rasmusen et al. (1991)
and Bernheim and Whinston (1998)).
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ket structure also aﬀects incentives for suppliers to choose a particular technology. More
speciÞcally, market structure aﬀects the trade-oﬀ between inframarginal cost savings and
cost savings on the margin. By studying the case of linear demand and cost functions,
we can make this trade-oﬀ fully explicit. We Þnd that the incentives to adopt a technol-
ogy with higher marginal costs are reduced if either suppliers become non-integrated or
if retailers become integrated. In contrast to the previous case where market structure
only aﬀected the distribution of industry proÞts, the size of industry proÞts and welfare
depends now on the market structure. We Þnd that retailers may now choose more of-
ten to become integrated as this induces suppliers to choose a more eﬃcient production
technology. Incidentally, implementing the eﬃcient technology also beneÞts consumers,
implying that in this case increased downstream concentration should not be contested
by any party. As argued in more detail below, our Þnding runs counter to the often
pronounced view that downstream (retailer) concentration reduces upstream eﬃciency.
However, we also Þnd that a regulator who takes consumer rents into consideration
would often prefer a diﬀerent market structure than that arising endogenously.
Before reviewing some of the related literature, we want to illustrate for the case
of retailer mergers why the issues discussed in this paper are of more than just aca-
demic interest. Since the emergence of large retail chains in the 1970s, buying power has
become a key feature in the relationship between manufacturers and retailers.2 While
economic analysis has traditionally viewed retailers as lacking in power on wholesale
markets, recent consolidation in the retailing sector has created market structures char-
acterized by bilateral oligopolies, where each retailer accounts for a relatively large share
of each suppliers sales.3 Furthermore, retailers often enjoy considerable market power at
their outlets, caused by consumers preferences for one-stop-shopping and an increasing
segmentation of retail formats (see OECD (1999)).4
2For example, Dell (1996, p. 50) reports that in the United Kingdom and France, the number of
outlets per capita has fallen to one-Þfth the level of thirty years ago, and 2 per cent of stores now
account for over half of all grocery sales. Similar trends can be observed in other European countries.
In the U.S. the supermarket industry is in the midst of an unprecedented merger wave. Recent examples
include Safeway and Dominicks, Kroger and Fred Meyer, and Ahold and Giant Food. For an overview
of recent concentration changes in the retailing sector see also Dobson and Waterson (1999) and OECD
(1999).
3The bilaterally oligopolistic market structure in the EU food retailing sector is described in Dobson
et al. (2000). According to their typology, only three EU markets are categorized as unconcentrated,
while four markets are dominated by a single retailer and Þve markets are either duopolies or tri-
opolies (see Dobson et al. (2000, table 4.2, p. 24)). At the EU level, retailer concentration is further
strengthened by cross-border alliances such as Associated Marketing Services, Euro Buying, or Buying
International Group (see Robinson and Clarke-Hill (1995)).
4Market power at the local outlet market has been identiÞed as the main source of buyer power (see,
e.g., OECD (1999)). For instance, in the recent United States/Toys R Us case it was ascertained
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Buyer power has also become an important issue in competition policy.5 Most no-
table, in the United States buyer power explicitly enters merger control as an eﬃciency
defence via the 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, with the revisions to Section 4 on
eﬃciencies in 1997.6,7 The buyer power defence asserts that lower input prices due to
higher purchasing power are passed (partially) through to consumers. As discussed
in more detail below, such a conclusion has only been theoretically sustained if sup-
ply contracts are linear and retailers compete in local outlet markets. Hence, at Þrst
sight consumers should be unaﬀected if retailers with previously independent markets
merge. This applies in particular to the increasing number of cross-country mergers,
take-overs, or alliances between retail chains, which do not aﬀect local downstream mar-
ket structure.8 According to an often expressed (but hitherto unmodeled) view, excessive
purchasing power may, however, damage the long-term viability of producers and could
therefore indirectly aﬀect consumer rents and overall welfare. For example, Dobson
et al. (2000, p. 12) argue that retailer concentration can have an economic impact
when [...] buyer power reduces prices for suppliers, and thus their income, making it
diﬃcult for them to Þnance required investments, which might then be postponed or
even foregone completely. One contribution of this paper is to qualify this view by
that it would be very diﬃcult for manufacturers to replace the 30 percent of their sales accounted for
by Toys R Us (see FTC (1996, 1997)).
5The growing concern about buying power in the legal debate in the United States and the European
Union is documented in Steptoe (1993), Ehlermann and Laudati (1997), Dobson et al. (1998), Vogel
(1998), Balto (1999), Dobson and Waterson (1999), OECD (1999), and Schwartz (1999).
6While eﬃciency claims in general have not been dispositive in any enforcement action belonging to
the retail sector, several courts have already considered such claims (see Balto (1999)). In the prominent
case FTC v. Staples, Inc. (970 F.Supp 1066 - D.D.C. 1997) the principal eﬃciency claim of the proposed
merger between Staples and Oﬃce Depot was based on enhanced buyer power (see Balto (1999) and
Pitofsky (1998) for assessments of that case from the FTCs perspetive). However, the court found that
the claims were not suﬃcient to oﬀset the anticompetitive eﬀects in those local markets, where the two
Þrms competed directly.
7The buyer power defence has also been made explicit in the 1998 Competition Act of the U.K. and
in the 1996 Business Acquisition Guidelines of the Commerce Commission of New Zealand. In the EU
merger enforcement buyer power was considered in the case Enso/Stora (Case No IV/M.1225). The
merger reduced the number of suppliers of liquid packaging board to three. As the market was also
heavily concentrated on the demand side, the Commission concluded that these circumstances produced
a situation of mutual dependence between buyers and sellers, which the merger was unlikely to disturb
(see European Commission (1998)).
8Examples for cross-country activities are the take-over of Spar (Germany) by Intermarchés
(France), SHG Makro (Netherland) by Metro AG (Germany) in 1997, or the take-over of BML (Aus-
tria) by REWE (Germany) a year earlier. That this process is not conÞned to a pan-European level is
documented by Wal-Marts acquisition of Wertkauf (Germany). See also Cotterill (2000) for mergers
between supermarket chains in the Unted States.
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studying the role of retailer concentration for the technology choice of suppliers. Our
analysis suggests that the above stated presumption has to be qualiÞed depending on
whether marginal or inframarginal cost reductions are considered. We show that under
negotiated contracts retailer integration shifts the bargaining problem for marginal to
inframarginal production quantities. This implies that suppliers have to bear relatively
more of their marginal costs, while inframarginal costs are shared to a larger extent with
the integrated retailer. Consequently, marginal costs reduction becomes more attractive
for suppliers when facing an integrated retailer. As consumers beneÞt from the resulting
lower price and higher quantity, we show that welfare is unambiguously increased.
In our framework the induced technology choice made by other parties in the value
chain can both motivate (retailer) mergers and determine their welfare impact. This
contrasts with more standard merger analysis where Þrms merge to either monopolize
the Þnal good market (e.g., Salant et al. (1983) and Deneckere and Davidson (1985)) or
to realize synergies within the merged Þrm (e.g., Williamson (1968), Perry and Porter
(1985) and Farrell and Shapiro (1990)).
Negotiated input prices have been previously studied in Horn and Wolinsky (1988a),
von Ungern-Sternberg (1996), and Dobson and Waterson (1997). The diﬀerences be-
tween these papers and our contribution are manyfold. Most importantly, they do not
cover the bilaterally oligopolistic case.9 Furthermore, all of these papers consider inef-
Þcient bargaining where contracts can only specify a constant unit price. Indeed, the
derived beneÞts from a horizontal (downstream) merger rely on the combination of this
contractual incompleteness with the assumption that retailers demand is interdepen-
dent.10 Note also that with interdependent demand horizontal mergers have the main
beneÞt of monopolizing the Þnal product market, which blurs the analysis of a mergers
impact on bargaining power. Finally, none of these papers has addressed the link be-
tween market structure and suppliers technology choice.
Our analysis of the interaction between market structure and technology choice is
related to three diﬀerent strands of the literature that analyze incentives for cost reduc-
tion and innovation. The Þrst strand analyses how Þrms incentives to reduce their costs
vary with the form of competition (e.g., Bertrand or Cournot), their market share, or the
presence of spill-overs (see Bester and Petrakis (1993), Flaherty (1980), Qiu (1997), and
9In particular, only Horn and Wolinsky (1988a) consider the case where there may be more than one
supplier. However, they assume that each retailer is locked-in with a particular supplier. The case of
locked-in retailers is also studied in Inderst and Wey (2000a), where the major beneÞt of a downstream
merger is to break this lock-in.
10For instance, in Dobson and Waterson (1997) a monopolistic supplier who grants a discount to one
particular retailer suﬀers from a decrease in his supply to other retailers, who buy at higher unit prices.
This negative externality allows the supplier to extract more rents from non-integrated retailers.
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Spence (1984), respectively). The second strand, which is more closely related to our
contribution, considers investment incentives under the problem of hold-up, where asset
ownership can partially compensate for contractual incompleteness (see Grossman and
Hart (1986), Hart and Moore (1990)). In light of this literature one of our contributions
is to combine in one application three important issues. We investigate how incentives
to invest in cost reduction are determined by (i) the nature of costs, (ii) the degree of
competition between investing suppliers, and (iii) the prevailing up- and downstream
market structure.
Finally, our result on how market structure aﬀects technology choice Þts well into the
perspective of innovative markets, which emphasizes the impact on innovative activi-
ties. Though this question has a long history,11 it has recently gained much importance
in antitrust policy.12 While typically this approach only considers concentration and
investment at the same market level, our paper suggests a broader view. Downstream
mergers may aﬀect investment and technology choice at upstream Þrms.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the economy. In Section
3 we propose and motivate the bargaining concept. Section 4 determines equilibrium
market structure when suppliers production technologies are exogenously Þxed, so that
mergers only aﬀect the distribution of industry proÞts. In Section 5 we introduce tech-
nology choice by suppliers. Section 6 analyzes the equilibrium market structure under
technology choice. In Section 7 we discuss modiÞcations to some assumptions. Section
8 concludes with possible extensions.
2 The Economy
We consider an intermediary goods market in whichN = 2 producers, which are denoted
by s ∈ S0 = {A,B}, sell their products to M = 2 retailers, which are denoted by
r ∈ R0 = {a, b}. We assume that each supplier commands over the production of one
diﬀerentiated good, where the total cost function is denoted byKs(·). Each retailer owns
a single outlet. Demand at diﬀerent outlets is independent. Note that this assumption
applies particularly to those cases where retailers are located in diﬀerent regions or even
11See Gilbert and Sunshine (1995) for an overview.
12In the U.S. the earliest directive that relevant antitrust markets be deÞned around research and
development activities can be found in the National Cooperative Research Act of 1984. The current
innovative market approach under Section 7 of the Clayton Act and Section 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act was Þrst applied in 1993, when the DOJ opposed the merger of the Allison Transmission
Division of General Motors and ZF Friedrichshafen. Since the release of the 1995 Intellectual Property
Guidelines the FTC has leveled complaints against several additional mergers on the grounds that
innovation markets would be harmed.
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countries. This assumption rules out standard monopolization eﬀects of mergers and
allows us to isolate the impact of market structure on bargaining power. We denote the
indirect demand function for good s at retailer r by psr(xsr, xs0r), with r ∈ R0, where
s0 6= s denotes the alternative supplier. A distinguishing feature of supply contracts in
intermediary goods markets, as opposed to Þnal goods markets, is that they are often
negotiated. Consistent with this, supply contracts will be the result of bargaining. We
denote the quantity of good s ∈ S0 supplied to retailer r ∈ R0 by xsr.
So far we have treated each supplier and each retailer separately. In the following,
we distinguish between four market structures, where suppliers or retailers can be inte-
grated. We denote a market structure by ω = (n,m), where n stands for the number
of independent suppliers and m stands for the number of independent retailers, with
n,m ∈ {1, 2}. As demand at the two outlets is independent, mergers do not aﬀect
supplied quantities, if suppliers technologies are Þxed. However, market structure will
determine the parties bargaining power and, thereby, the distribution of rents.
3 Bargaining Concept
3.1 SpeciÞcation of the Bargaining Concept
Negotiations are conducted between all independent suppliers and retailers. We employ
the same bargaining concept for all market structures. In Section 3.2 we describe a
particular bargaining procedure, which seems rather natural to us. In particular, it is
characterized by simultaneous eﬃcient contracting. As discussed in detail below, this
procedure gives rise to the Shapley value. For this reason we choose to start out with
the Shapley value as our solution concept to multilateral bargaining, while postponing
the description of the underlying procedure.
We denote total industry proÞts for given supplies by
W
¡{xsr}sr∈S0×R0¢ = X
r∈R0
[pAr(xAr, xBr)xAr + pBr(xBr, xAr)xBr]−
X
s∈S0
Ks(xsa + xsb).
Denoting the set of all Þrms by Ω = {A,B, a, b}, we deÞneWΩ as the maximum industry
proÞts. Suppose now that supplier s = A leaves the market, which gives us the subset
Ω\ {A}. Calculating the maximum industry proÞts subject to the constraint that xAa =
xAb = 0, we denote the respective value by WΩ\{A}. We can proceed like this for any
subset Ω0 ⊆ Ω and derive the resulting maximum industry proÞts WΩ0. Naturally, the
industry proÞt is zero if a subset of Þrms does not include a retailer or a supplier. For
the calculation of eﬃcient supplies under the various scenarios, we impose the following
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assumption, which helps us below to identify our bargaining procedure with the Shapley
value.
Assumption A.1. W (·) is strictly quasi-concave. It is also continuous for strictly
positive supplies and equal to zero if all supplies are set to zero.13
Note that (A.1) allows for the existence of Þxed operating costs, which are inde-
pendendent of the produced qantity of the respective good, but are incurred only if
production takes place. To calculate the Shapley value, we have to specify a particular
market structure to identify the set of independently negotiating parties, which is de-
noted by Ψ. For instance, for ω = (2, 1), we obtain Ψ = {A,B, ab}, where ab denotes
the integrated retailer. According to the Shapley value, the payoﬀ of a member ψ ∈ Ψ
is given by14
X
ψ∈Ψ; Ψ∈Ψ
(
¯¯¯
Ψ
¯¯¯
− 1)!(|Ψ|−
¯¯¯
Ψ
¯¯¯
)!
|Ψ|!
h
WΨ −WΨ\{ψ}
i
. (1)
It reßects the incremental contribution of ψ to various subsets Ψ ⊆ Ψ. While this
solution concept can be justiÞed on axiomatic grounds, we argue in the next section
that it is also the outcome of a rather natural description of simultaneous bargaining in
a bilaterally oligopolistic industry.
3.2 Bargaining Procedure
We propose now a particular bargaining procedure which, under additional assumptions,
gives rise to the Shapley value. Our proposed bargaining procedure contains the following
ingredients:
(i) Simultaneous bilateral bargaining: We assume simultaneous bilateral negotiations
between the representatives of each independent retailer and supplier. For instance,
under ω = (1, 2) the integrated supplier employs two sales representatives (agents). One
of his agents negotiates with retailer a, while the other agent visits retailer b.
(ii) Eﬃcient bargaining and (net) surplus sharing: In all bilateral negotiations the
respective agents choose the respective supplies so as to maximize the joint surplus of
the two parties. When determining supplies, the two parties form rational expectations
13This condition holds in particular for the case of linear demand and cost functions, on which we
focus in Section 5.
14
¯¯¯
Ψ
¯¯¯
and |Ψ| denote the numbers of elements in these sets. Observe also that W(·) represents the
characteristic function.
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about the outcomes of all other simultaneous negotiations. Moreover, transfers between
the two parties are speciÞed so as to split the net surplus equally.15
(iii) Contingent contracts: In each negotiation the two sides conclude contracts for
all possible contingencies, where a contingency describes the set of successful bilateral
negotiations in the industry. For instance, under ω = (1, 2) the agents of the integrated
supplier and retailer a negotiate over two contracts, specifying transfers and supplies
for the two cases where simultaneous negotiations with retailer b are either successfully
concluded or have broken down. For each of these agreements the requirements of (ii),
i.e., eﬃcient bargaining and sharing of net surplus, apply.
The requirements (i)-(iii) can be easily formalized (see Appendix B). They give rise
to an iterative procedure, starting from the simplest contingencies, where all other ne-
gotiations break down, up to the contingency where all negotiations are successful.16
We analyze now under which conditions this procedure has a unique equilibrium
outcome that gives rise to the same equilibrium proÞts as those calculated under the
Shapley value. Observe that this requires both that equilibrium supplies are chosen eﬃ-
ciently (to maximize industry proÞts) and that industry rents are distributed according
to the Shapley value formula (1). As is easily seen, (A.1) is not suﬃcient to ensure that
equilibrium supplies are uniquely determined. For instance, this may be the case if goods
are complements and failure to supply good A at r = a may make it also eﬃcient not to
supply good B at this retailer. Decreasing unit costs provide another example. One way
to rule out this multiplicity, which is due to the assumption of simultaneous bargaining
and the resulting problem of co-ordination failure between diﬀerent agents, would be to
impose some reÞnement, e.g., in the form of coalition-proofness.17 An alternative route
is to invoke additional assumptions on the demand and cost functions which ensure that
this problem does not arise.
The following conditions are suﬃcient to establish uniqueness of equilibrium supplies
under the proposed bargaining procedure. Suppose that only a subset of the four possible
supplier-retailer links sr is active; i.e., that only these supplies can be positive. If
we choose the respective supplies xsr to maximize industry proÞts, we require that all
supplies must be positive. Moreover, if we now consider an additional supplier-retailer
link sr with supplies xsr, then maximizing industry proÞts while keeping the original
supplies Þxed shall imply xsr > 0.
These requirements are now re-stated more formally in the following assumption.18
15The assumption that surplus is split equally is not essential for our qualitative results.
16We discuss in Section 7 how changes in these requirements would aﬀect our results.
17This has been used in a slighlty related setting by Bernheim and Whinston (1986).
18Note that (A.2) requires in particular that Þxed costs are suﬃciently low. Below we discuss in detail
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Assumption A.2. Exclusion of corner solutions:
(i) Consider a non-empty set of supplier-retailer links L.19 Maximizing W (·), where
xsr = 0 for all (sr) /∈ L, must imply xsr > 0 for all (sr) ∈ L. Denote the optimal
choices by xsr(L).20
(ii) Consider some L and (sr) /∈ L. Then maximizing W (·), where xsr = xsr(L) for
(sr) ∈ L and xsr = 0 for (sr) /∈ L ∪ {(sr)}, must imply xsr > 0.
Given Assumptions (A.1) and (A.2), it is now easily checked that equilibrium sup-
plies are uniquely determined and strictly positive for all bilateral negotiations and all
contingencies. Moreover, they are chosen to maximize total industry proÞts.
Given the determination of supplies, we turn next to the question of how proÞts
are distributed. Consider the case with bilateral non-integration. Denote the payoﬀ
of supplier A for the contingency that all negotiations are successful by UA and that
of retailer a by Ua. If bargaining between these two parties breaks down, denote the
respective payoﬀs under the new contingency by UA and Ua. Recall now that players
split the net surplus in each bilateral negotiation. Clearly, this implies
UA − Ua = UA − Ua. (2)
The implication (2) is called the condition of balancedness or balanced -contribution
condition, which under our requirements must hold for all bilateral negotiations and all
contingencies.21 By results in Jackson and Wolinsky (1996), which extend those in
Myerson (1977), this condition indeed implies that equilibrium payoﬀs are determined
by the Shapley value.22 ,23 This implication extends clearly to the cases where one or
both sides of the market are integrated.
Admittedly, our speciÞcation of the bargaining procedure falls short of the full de-
scription of a game. To Þll this gap, consider any bilateral negotiation. We specify that
the suppliers agent is chosen to make an oﬀer. If the retailers agent rejects, then there
is another and last round of bargaining where either side is chosen with equal proba-
bility to make a Þnal oﬀer. Additionally, we assume that with some (arbitrarily) small
probability ε the two sides fail to start negotiations due to some exogenous event. It is
the linear case where these conditions are made explicit.
19Formally, L is an element of the power set of S0 ×R0.
20Observe that xsr(L) are uniquel determined due to Assumption (A.1).
21This shall not be confused with the balancedness condition in the theory of the core.
22Precisely, we can apply their Theorem 4 after noting that our condition of non-interdependent
demand is equivalent to their requirement that the value function (i.e.,W(·)) is component additive.
23The balancedness condition is also used in Stole and Zwiebel (1996a/b) when showing that their
bargaining procedure between a single Þrm and n workers obtains the Shapley value. In contrast to our
bargaining procedure, their main assumption is that simple wage contracts are non-binding.
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easily checked that an equilibrium of this game supports the equilibrium outcome of our
bargaining procedure.24 ,25
4 Horizontal Integration
4.1 Equilibrium Payoﬀs
We now calculate equilibrium payoﬀs under the diﬀerent market structures. While
the calculation of payoﬀs is immediate from the Shapley value, we want to use this
opportunity to illustrate the bargaining procedure proposed in Section 3.2. For this
purpose we consider the case ω = (1, 2), where only suppliers are integrated.
Illustration of the bargaining procedure for the case ω = (1, 2)
We denote the payoﬀ of retailer r under market structure ω = (1, 2) by U1,2r and that
of the integrated suppliers by U1,2AB. Applying the Shapley value yields
U1,2AB =
1
3
[WΩ +
1
2
WΩ\{a} +
1
2
WΩ\{b}], (3)
U1,2a =
1
3
[WΩ −WΩ\{a} + 1
2
WΩ\{b}],
U1,2b =
1
3
[WΩ −WΩ\{b} + 1
2
WΩ\{a}].
We show now how we obtain (3) from our bargaining procedure as presented in Section
3.2. The integrated supplier signs with the two retailers r = a, b the following contracts.
One contract speciÞes supplies and transfers for the case when bargaining with the other
retailer is also successful. A second contract is implemented if no contract is signed with
the other retailer. Moreover, for each contingency supplies are chosen eﬃciently and
the net surplus is split equally. Suppose now bargaining between the integrated supplier
and retailer b breaks down. For this contingency the contract with retailer a allows the
supplier to realize the payoﬀ 1
2
WΩ\{b}, i.e., half of the maximum industry proÞts which
24The issue of uniqueness is more contrived for two reasons. First, without additional frictions before
the second round, players are indiﬀerent between striking a deal in the Þrst round and waiting until
either side is chosen to make a Þnal oﬀer. Second, simultaneous bargaining with multiple parties gives
rise to the following possibility of rent-extraction. Consider bargaining betweenA and a. Their contracts
may now specify a substantial (additional) transfer to A if there is agreement in the pair (B, a), while
the opposite happens if there is agreement in (A, b). This construction allows the two parties to extract
substantial rents in their simultaneous negotiations with B and b, respectively. In Section 7 we have
more to say on this issue.
25Though a game with an open time horizon (as in Binmore et al. (1986)) would seem more attractive,
this poses the problem to specify whether the whole industry is stalled if there is delay in a particular
relation; a problem which also arises in two-person multi-issue bargaining situations (see Inderst (2000)).
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are feasible without retailer b. Likewise the contract with retailer b speciÞes that either
side realizes 1
2
WΩ\{a} if there is no agreement with retailer a. Based on these results we
can now determine contracts for the contingency where all negotiations are successful.
Denote for this purpose the respective total transfer from retailer r to the integrated
supplier by tr, which is paid for the supply of xAr, xBr. When bargaining with r = a,
the net surplus, Sa, is given by
Sa = xAapAa(xAa,xBa) + xBapBa(xBa, xAa)
−KA(xAa + xAb)−KB(xBa + xBb) +KA(xAb) +KB(xBb).
As the net surplus is again split equally, retailer a must realize U1,2a =
1
2
Sa, while the
supplier realizes U1,2AB =
1
2
WΩ\{a} + 12Sa. We can proceed likewise for negotiations with
retailer b, where U1,2b =
1
2
Sb and U
1,2
AB =
1
2
WΩ\{b} + 12Sb. As U
1,2
a + U
1,2
b + U
1,2
AB = WΩ, it
is straightforward to obtain from these requirements the payoﬀs stated in (3).
Equilibrium payoﬀs
To determine equilibrium market structures in what follows, it is suﬃcient to cal-
culate the joint payoﬀs of suppliers and retailers. Moreover, as total industry proÞts
are invariant to the choice of market structure, it is suﬃcient to state in each case the
joint payoﬀs of suppliers. A complete statement of payoﬀs for the individual parties is
conÞned to the Appendix.
Proposition 1. Under the diﬀerent market structures we obtain for the aggregate
payoﬀs of suppliers:
(i) Bilateral integration, ω = (1, 1): 1
2
WΩ,
(ii) Integrated suppliers, ω = (1, 2): 1
3
£
WΩ +
1
2
WΩ\{a} + 12WΩ\{b}
¤
,
(iii) Integrated retailers, ω = (2, 1): 1
3
£
2WΩ − 12WΩ\{A} − 12WΩ\{B}
¤
,
(iv) Non-integration, ω = (2, 2): 1
2
WΩ +
1
6
£
WΩ\{a} +WΩ\{b} −WΩ\{A} −WΩ\{B}
¤
.
Proof. See Appendix.
4.2 Equilibrium Market Structure
To determine the equilibrium market structure, we Þrst compare the joint payoﬀs of
retailers and suppliers in the various cases. Simple calculations give rise to the following
lemma.
Lemma 1.
(i) Regardless of whether retailers are integrated or not, suppliers joint payoﬀs are
higher under integration if
WΩ\{A} +WΩ\{B} > WΩ, (4)
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while their joint payoﬀs are lower under integration if the inequality is reversed.
(ii) Regardless of whether suppliers are integrated or not, retailers joint payoﬀs are
higher under integration if
WΩ\{a} +WΩ\{b} > WΩ, (5)
while their joint payoﬀs are lower under integration if the inequality is reversed.
We say that a market structure is an equilibrium market structure if the joint proÞts
of participants on either side of the market do not increase if they change their respective
market structure (while, of course, the structure on the other side remains unchanged).26
The following corollary follows therefore directly from Lemma 1.
Corollary 1. The equilibrium market structure satisÞes:
i) Suppliers are integrated if WΩ\{A}+WΩ\{B} > WΩ and they stay non-integrated if
WΩ\{A} +WΩ\{B} < WΩ.
ii) Retailers are integrated if WΩ\{a} +WΩ\{b} > WΩ and they stay non-integrated if
WΩ\{a} +WΩ\{b} < WΩ.
Before providing some intuition for these results, we brießy investigate when con-
ditions (4) and (5) should hold. Consider Þrst the retailers incentives to merge. We
say that the cost function Ks(·) exhibits strictly increasing (decreasing) unit costs if
Ks(x)/x is strictly increasing (decreasing) on x > 0. It can be shown that (5) must hold
if both cost functions exhibit strictly increasing unit costs, while the converse holds if
both cost functions exhibit strictly decreasing unit costs. Consider next suppliers. We
say that the two goods are strict substitutes if x00s0r > x
0
s0r and psr(xsr, x
0
s0r) > 0 imply
psr(xsr, x
0
s0r) > psr(xsr, x
00
s0r), for any choices s, s
0 ∈ S0, s 6= s0, and r ∈ R0. In this case
we can show that (4) holds, implying that suppliers become integrated. If x00s0r > x
0
s0r and
psr(xsr, x
00
s0r) > 0 imply psr(xsr, x
0
s0r) < psr(xsr, x
00
s0r), for any choices s, s
0 ∈ S0, s 6= s0,
and r ∈ R0, we say that goods are strict complements. In this case suppliers prefer to
stay non-integrated.
Proposition 2. If both suppliers have strictly increasing (decreasing) unit costs,
retailers are integrated (non-integrated) in equilibrium. If products are strict substitutes
(complements) at the two outlets, suppliers are integrated (non-integrated) in equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix.
Using the bargaining procedure proposed in Section 3.2, we now provide additional
intuition for our results. Consider Þrst the incentives of retailers to integrate. As supplies
26For a precise formulation of these conditions, see e.g., Selten (1973).
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are not aﬀected by market structure and total rents are therefore left unchanged, inte-
gration can only shift rents between retailers and suppliers. If a non-integrated retailer a
bargains with a supplier, they consider the additional costs incurred by the delivery to a.
The same logic applies to negotiations with r = b. In contrast, if retailers are integrated,
the two sides negotiate about the total supply of the respective good. Loosely speaking,
negotiating separately with two non-integrated retailers allows a supplier to roll-over
more of his additional or marginal costs. If unit costs are increasing, the supplier will
thus enjoy more of the infra-marginal rents. If retailers become integrated in this case,
they gain access to a larger share of these rents. The same principle prevails in the case
of supplier integration. For instance, if goods are complements, the positive cross-price
eﬀect implies that the net or additional surplus created by each good is increased. Hence,
in case of complements, suppliers prefer to negotiate at the margin.27
Broadly speaking, integration shifts bargaining away from the margin. If the created
net surplus is smaller at the margin, which is the case with increasing unit costs or
substitutes, the respective market side prefers to become integrated. While the explo-
ration of this principle in the framework of a (bilaterally) oligopolistic market is to our
knowledge new, the general principle has been already detected by Horn and Wolinsky
(1988b) and Jun (1989). Both papers analyze bargaining between one Þrm and two
workers (or groups of workers). Each worker can supply one unit of labor. If their re-
spective inputs are complements, workers can extract much of the surplus by bargaining
independently.28
Observe that our results qualify the concept of buyer power. Indeed, we identify
reasonable circumstances under which retailers would be worse oﬀ if they were integrated.
This is more likely if the industry exhibits high Þxed costs and strong economies of scale.
On the other side, if tight capacity implies that unit costs are increasing fast, the beneÞts
from integration should be rather high for retailers.
We consider it worthwhile to brießy elaborate more on the role of capacity constraints.
Suppose that the economy can be in one of two states, where total demand is either high
or low. In the high-demand state capacity constraints of suppliers are rather binding,
27While these results have only been derived for the duopolistic case, they can be extended as follows.
For instance, under increasing (decreasing) unit costs at all suppliers it can be shown that the payoﬀ of
a monopsonistic retailer is higher (lower) than the total payoﬀ of all dis-integrated retailers. However, in
this case the derivation of an equilibrium market structure poses the new issue of coalition stability,
which is beyond the scope of this paper.
28The eﬀects have also been exploited by Bolton and Scharfstein (1996), where the individual agree-
ments of debtholders have a complementary role. Stole and Zwiebel (1999a/b) consider bargaining
between one Þrm and many workers, while Segal (2000) allows coalitions to specify alternative contrac-
tual arrangements. For earlier work see the references in Legros (1987).
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implying that each retailer becomes more or less dispensable. In fact, even if total supply
would be sold at only one retailer, this might only slightly depress prices and revenues.
In particular, it may hold that WΩ\{a} +WΩ\{b} > WΩ, where the upper bar denotes
the high-demand state. We know that in this case retailers would prefer to become
integrated. Consider next the case with low demand and thus more than suﬃcient
capacity. If producing involves, however, some Þxed costs, this could imply overall
decreasing unit costs and thus WΩ\{a}+WΩ\{b} < WΩ, where the lower bar denotes the
low-demand state. Retailers would then be better oﬀ to stay non-integrated. If market
structure exhibits a suﬃcient degree of inertia, which seems to be a realistic assumption,
retailers choice now depends on their outlook on future demand.
Clearly, Proposition 2 does not exhaust all possible cases. For instance, unit costs
may be decreasing and increasing at diﬀerent output levels. Moreover, one of the two
suppliers may enjoy decreasing unit costs while the other supplier has increasing unit
costs. Under these circumstances we can still make precise predictions on the equilibrium
market structure by referring to the conditions (4) and (5) in Lemma 1.
5 Horizontal Integration and Technology Choice
In the preceding analysis market structure does not aﬀect equilibrium supplies. In that
sense the industrys performance is invariant to market structure. Particularly, total
welfare and consumer surplus are not aﬀected by market structure, implying no role for
merger control. In this and the following section we let suppliers choose technologies
and study the interaction with market structure. Among other things, this will imply
the possibility of welfare enhancing merger policy.
In this section we assume that one supplier can choose between two production
technologies which diﬀer with respect to inframarginal and marginal cost levels.29 More
precisely, we consider two technologies i = α, β, where technology α exhibits relatively
low inframarginal (or Þxed production) costs and relatively high marginal costs. For the
other technology β this relation is reversed. By adopting technology β the supplier gains
a higher degree of volume ßexibility in the sense that high output levels are relatively
cheaper to produce.30 Instead of a change in production costs, we could also imagine that
29As the two suppliers produce diﬀerentiated products, assuming that only one supplier has the choice
to switch to a production technology is not unrealistic.
30The analysis of volume ßexibility in the context of technology choice has been pioneered by Stigler
(1939) and Marshak and Nelson (1962). The subsequent literature has mainly focused on the interaction
with demand uncertainty (see, e.g., Vives (1986, 1989), Eaton and Schmitt (1994), and Boyer and
Moreaux (1997)). A practical example is given in Economic Commission for Europe (1986, p. 115),
which attributes the cost diﬀerential to the cost of computers and material handling [which] are usually
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the supplier can choose between diﬀerent distribution strategies. Using a highly ßexible
(computerized) logistical system may make it cheaper to ship additional quantities, but
again this may come at higher operating expenses.
Our model isolates the following two eﬀects of market structure on technology choice,
where the Þrst eﬀect is obtained by separating retailers and the second by separating
suppliers.
1. Rent-Sharing Eﬀect: By separating retailers, bargaining is shifted towards marginal
production levels, so that suppliers have to bear a larger share of their inframarginal
costs and a smaller share of their marginal costs compared to the case of retailer
integration. As a result, suppliers have more incentives to trade-oﬀ lower infra-
marginal costs with higher marginal costs if retailers stay non-integrated.
2. Competition Eﬀect: If suppliers become non-integrated and goods are substitutes,
a marginal cost reduction leads to a decreasing output level of the rival supplier.
This negative externality from a marginal cost reduction is not internalized if sup-
pliers are not integrated. Hence, disintegrating suppliers increases the incentives
to reduce marginal costs at the expense of higher inframarginal costs.
In what follows, we consider a three stage game. In the Þrst stage, suppliers and
retailers choose whether to become integrated or not. In the second stage, the supplier
commanding over production of brand s = A decides which technology to choose, and
in the third stage supply contracts are negotiated.31 The following section analyzes the
second stage of the game, i.e., optimal technology choice for a given market structure.
In Section 6 we will turn to the Þrst stage and derive the equilibrium market structure.
5.1 Technology Choice
Throughout this section we restrict consideration to the case where technologies and
demand are both linear. We invoke both speciÞcations in turn before proceeding to the
analysis.
Technologies
We consider the following problem of technology choice. Goods can be produced with
two technologies indexed by i ∈ I = {α,β}. Initially, both goods are produced with the
same technology i = α. However, supplier s = A can switch costlessly to technology
β. We denote the respective cost functions under the two regimes by Ki(x) = F i + kix
higher (under ßexible manufacturing).
31We thus assume that market structure exhibits suﬃcient inertia so that it cannot be changed (again)
right after the technology has been chosen.
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for x > 0. The cost component F i is only incurred for positive supply level, while costs
are zero if no production takes place. Consequently, these Þxed costs are not sunk
before bargaining starts, but are part of the bilateral negotiation between suppliers and
retailers. To make this clear, we refer to them as (Þxed) operating costs. Below we
brießy discuss the case where adjusting marginal or operating costs involves sunk costs,
which are no longer part of subsequent negotiations.
We assume that technology β has lower (constant) marginal but higher operating
costs; i.e., it holds that 0 ≤ kβ < kα < 1 and 0 ≤ Fα < F β. It is convenient to denote
∆F = F
β − Fα > 0 and ∆k = kα − kβ > 0. Observe that the diﬀerence Kβ(x)−Kα(x)
is strictly decreasing in x and strictly positive at x = 0. For simplicity of exposition, we
set kβ = 0 and Fα = 0, so that ∆F = F β and ∆k = kα.
Demand
The utility of a representative consumer purchasing at outlet r the quantities xsr of
supplier s at prices psr is given by
xAr + xBr − 1
2
£
x2Ar + x
2
Br + 2cxArxBr
¤− xArpAr − xBrpBr.
As is well-known, this gives rise to a system of linear demand functions, where the
inverse demand function for xsr is given by psr = 1−xsr− cxs0r, with s0 6= s. We restrict
attention to the case of substitutes where 0 < c < 1. Moreover, to ensure that (A.2)
holds, we require
c < c¯ ≡ min
½
1−∆k, 1− 2
√
∆F
1−∆k
¾
. (6)
The derivation of this condition is contained in the Appendix.
We can now proceed with the analysis. It is intuitive that for a given market structure
ω and Þxed values of c and∆k technology i = β is only chosen if the increase in operating
costs∆F remains suﬃciently small. Precisely, for any market structure we can determine
a threshold ∆ωF such that i = β is strictly preferred if and only if ∆F < ∆
ω
F . To make
our procedure well-understood, consider the case where both sides are integrated such
that the aggregate payoﬀ of suppliers is half of total industry proÞts. Comparing the
respective payoﬀs under the two technology regimes, we obtain for the threshold ∆1,1F
the expression
∆1,1F = 2Γ,
where Γ ≡ 1
4
∆k
1−c2 [2(1− c)(1−∆k) +∆k]. Proceeding as in this case for all market
structures, we obtain the following result.
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Lemma 2. Technology i = β is chosen as long as the diﬀerence in operating costs
∆F is not larger than ∆ωF , where
32
∆1,1F = 2Γ,
∆1,2F =
3
2
Γ,
∆2,2F =
3
2
Γ+
1
8
Θ,
∆2,1F = 2Γ+
1
6
Θ,
with Θ ≡ c∆k
1−c2 [2(1− c)(1−∆k)− c∆k].
Proof. See Appendix.
Using Lemma 2, we can determine which market structure is more likely to lead to
either technology α or β being chosen.33
Proposition 3. In the linear case, thresholds ∆ωF for the technology choice satisfy
the following ordering:
∆1,2F < ∆
2,2
F < ∆
1,1
F < ∆
2,1
F .
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 3 conÞrms the stipulated rent-sharing and competition eﬀects. The
supplier controlling the production at A cares more about marginal cost-savings if ei-
ther retailers become integrated or suppliers stay non-integrated. More formally, by
Proposition 3 we obtain for m = 1, 2 that ∆m,2F − ∆m,1F < 0 and for n = 1, 2 that
∆2,nF −∆1,nF > 0, which illustrates the competition eﬀect.34 As a consequence, the mar-
ket structure ω = (2, 1) yields the strongest incentives to adopt technology β; i.e., for a
given reduction in marginal costs, ∆k, this market structure allows the largest operating
cost increase, ∆F . On the other side of the spectrum, the market structure ω = (1, 1)
implies the lowest incentives to choose technology β with lower marginal costs.35 Re-
garding the two intermediate cases, the two eﬀects work in opposite directions. It turns
out that in our example the rent-sharing eﬀect dominates. However, it is instructive
to see how the diﬀerence in the two threshold ∆1,1F and ∆
2,2
F changes in the degree of
32For the sake of brevity, we ignore the (non-generic) case of indiﬀerence.
33To compare ∆1,1F with ∆
2,2
F note that Θ > 0 follows from condition (6).
34The impact of coalitional (or ownership) structure on various forms of cost-reducing investment
goes back Hart and Moore (1990). See also more recently Stole and Zwiebel (1996a,b), where a single
Þrm bargains with its workers. In this setting only the rent-sharing eﬀect is obtained.
35Recall that we now only consider the case of substitues. It is intuitive that with complements, i.e.,
for c < 0, ω = (2, 1) implies the lowest incentives to choose technology β.
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substitutability. We obtain that ∆1,1F −∆2,2F strictly decreases in c, which underlines once
again the role of the competition eﬀect.36
Before proceeding with the analysis, we brießy discuss the related case where sup-
pliers can invest to reduce costs. For this case the choice of technology involves an
up-front investment which cannot be (partially) recuperated in subsequent negotiations.
Incentives to reduce marginal or infra-marginal costs are now aﬀected diﬀerently by the
market structure. Focusing again on the linear case, incentives to reduce operating costs
do only depend on the downstream market structure. If retailers are integrated, we
know that the supplier can roll-over a larger portion of operating costs, which reduces
his incentives to lower marginal costs. In contrast, incentives to reduce marginal costs
only depend on the upstream market structure. It is easy to establish that integration
of suppliers decreases the beneÞts from reducing marginal costs.37,38 For if suppliers are
not integrated, supplier A does not internalize the (negative) demand spill-over for good
s = B after a reduction in marginal costs.
5.2 Eﬃciency Benchmarks
Next we compare the respective technology choices with two benchmarks of eﬃciency:
industry proÞts and welfare. First, we consider industry proÞts. It is immediate that
technology choice under a bilateral monopoly, ω = (1, 1), maximizes aggregate prof-
its. Proposition 3 allows to obtain the parameter regions for which alternative market
structures lead to a less eﬃcient choice.
Corollary 2. In the linear case the following results hold regarding industry proÞts:
(i) If ∆F ∈
¡
∆1,1F ,∆
2,1
F
¢
, ω = (2, 1) implements the less eﬃcient technology.
36Precisely, we obtain d[∆
1,1
F −∆2,2F ]
dc = −
∆k[(1−c)2−∆k((1−c)2+c)]
2(1−c2)2 . Note that the numerator is strictly
positive if ∆k <
(1−c)2
(1−c)2+c , which holds by (6).
37Let ks denote the marginal costs of supplier s. Then, diﬀerentiating the payoﬀ of the non-integrated
supplier A with respect to its marginal costs, we obtain dUAdkA =
1
1−c2
1
4 [2(1 − kA) − 2c(1 − kB)], while
proceeding analogously for the integrated supplier yields dUABdkA =
1
1−c2
1
4 [2(1 − kA)3−c
2
3 − 43c(1 − kB)].
As (1− kA)c > 1− kB holds, the incentives for the non-integrated supplier to reduce his marginal costs
are higher.
38This dichotomy, i.e., that incentives to reduce marginal (inframarginal) costs are only aﬀected
by upstream (downstream) market structure, is driven by our assumption of constant marginal costs.
Generally, our previous analysis suggests that downstream integration and upstream non-integration
imply higher investment if this aﬀects predominately costs at high output levels, while downstream
non-integration and upstream integration spur investment that helps to reduce costs at relatively low
levels of output. Interestingly, in the latter case the resulting cost reduction may not increase industry
proÞts if cost-levels at equilibrium output are not aﬀected. In this case the investment is solely made
to enhance suppliers outside option in the subsequent negotiations.
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(ii) If ∆F ∈
¡
∆2,2F ,∆
1,1
F
¢
, ω = (2, 2) and ω = (1, 2) implement the less eﬃcient
technology.
(iii) If ∆F ∈
¡
∆1,2F ,∆
2,2
F
¢
, ω = (1, 2) implements the less eﬃcient technology.
(iv) For all other cases all market structures implement the eﬃcient technology.
We come next to a comparison of social welfare (the sum of industry proÞts and
consumer surplus). Precisely, we have now in mind a regulator who can prescribe market
structure, but neither directly the choice of technology nor that of individual outputs.
As the supplied quantities are independent of the market structure for given technology,
the regulator is thus only concerned with the impact of market structure on technology
choice. By substituting equilibrium quantities, we can determine social welfare under
the two technology regimes. We denote social welfare when technology i ∈ I is used
by SW i. Comparison of SWα and SW β yields a unique threshold for the diﬀerence of
operating costs ∆F , which is now denoted by ∆∗F . We obtain
∆∗F = 3Γ.
Hence, the choice i = β maximizes welfare if and only if ∆F ≤ ∆∗F . To determine
whether a given market structure maximizes welfare, it thus remains to compare ∆∗F
with the respective thresholds derived in Proposition 4.
Proposition 4. In the linear case the welfare threshold ∆∗F satisÞes
∆∗F > ∆
2,1
F .
Proof. See Appendix.
This result is intuitive given that retailers set prices to maximize industry proÞts.
As a consequence, equilibrium supply is always ineﬃciently low. To counteract this
marginalization eﬀect, the regulator has a stronger preference for the technology with
smaller marginal costs and thus a higher equilibrium supply. Note that this argument
suggests quite generally that the regulator should have a stronger preference for the
technology with lower marginal costs than suppliers under all market structures ω ∈
{(1, 2), (2, 2), (1, 1)}.39
Proposition 4 implies the following result.
Corollary 3. In the linear case the following results hold regarding total welfare:
(i) If ∆F ∈
¡
∆2,1F ,∆
∗
F
¢
, all market structures implement the less eﬃcient technology.
(ii) If ∆F ∈
¡
∆1,1F ,∆
2,1
F
¢
, ω = (1, 2), ω = (2, 2), and ω = (1, 1) implement the less
eﬃcient technology.
39While this insight should extend beyond the particular choice of linear demand, this should not
hold for the ordering of ∆∗F and ∆
2,1
F .
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(iii) If ∆F ∈
¡
∆2,2F ,∆
1,1
F
¢
, ω = (1, 2) and ω = (2, 2) implement the less eﬃcient
technology.
(iv) If ∆F ∈
¡
∆1,2F ,∆
2,2
F
¢
,ω = (1, 2) implements the less eﬃcient technology.
(v) For all other cases all market structures implement the eﬃcient technology.
As a consequence of Proposition 4 and Corollary 3, a regulator is more likely to
prefer the market structure ω = (2, 1), i.e., to integrate retailers, but to keep suppliers
disintegrated.
Given the benchmarks in Corollaries 2-3, the natural question is now which mar-
ket structure would arise endogenously. As goods are substitutes and unit costs are
non-increasing, the Þrst conjecture would be that suppliers merge while retailers stay
disintegrated. This conjecture is, however, wrong for retailers who now take into con-
sideration the impact of their organizational form on suppliers technology choice.
6 Equilibrium Market Structure with Technology
Choice
Consider Þrst the choice of upstream market structure. As goods are substitutes, we
know that integration allows suppliers to extract more of total industry proÞts. As
the decision to implement α or β is made optimally by the respective supplier, it is
straightforward that regardless of the downstream market structure suppliers will be-
come integrated. In contrast, as retailers cannot directly control the choice of technology,
they must take this into consideration when choosing whether to become integrated. If
∆F is below∆
1,2
F , suppliers will always choose technology β regardless of the downstream
market structure. Given the resulting strictly decreasing unit costs at plant A, retailers
are better oﬀ by staying non-integrated. Similarly, suppliers technology choice is also
unaﬀected by downstream market structure if ∆F exceeds ∆
1,1
F . As both goods are now
produced with technology α, which has zero operating costs, retailers are indiﬀerent
towards integration.40 Hence, for relatively low or high values of ∆F the picture has
not changed compared to our previous analysis. In contrast, for ∆F ∈ (∆1,2F ,∆1,1F ) we
Þnd that retailers become integrated, even though the resulting choice of technology β
implies strictly decreasing unit costs.
Proposition 5. In the linear case the equilibrium market structure under technology
choice is ω = (1, 2) for all ∆F < ∆
1,2
F and ω = (1, 1) for all ∆F ∈ (∆1,2F ,∆1,1F ). For
∆F > ∆
1,1
F either ω = (1, 2) or ω = (1, 1) may emerge.
40This indiﬀerence could be easily resolved by assuming Fα > 0. While not aﬀecting the previous
results as long as ∆F > 0, this somewhat complicates all expressions.
20
Proof. See Appendix.
Retailers prefer to merge for ∆F ∈ (∆1,2F ,∆1,1F ) as this tilts the suppliers choice of
technology towards β. Observe that for this interval β maximizes industry proÞts. While
integration reduces the retailers share of the total surplus as their bargaining position
deteriorates, this is more than compensated by the resulting increase in total proÞts,
which can be distributed.
In the case where retailers integrate strategically to inßuence suppliers technology
choice, we know from Corollary 3 that this leads also to an increase in total welfare. The
resulting switch to the technology with lower marginal costs boosts output and consumer
rents. Hence, in this case all parties, i.e., suppliers, retailers, and consumers, gain from
a higher concentration in the downstream market. Our analysis, therefore, suggests a
new buyer-power based eﬃciency defence for downstream mergers. By shifting the bar-
gaining problem with suppliers away from the margin, downstream mergers improve the
appropriability of rents from marginal cost reductions and thus lead to lower consumer
prices. While the regulator would thus support integration of retailers, it also follows
from Corollary 3 that he would want suppliers to stay non-integrated so as to ensure
that technology β is implemented for a larger spectrum of ∆F .
While our analysis is limited to the linear case, we believe that the point we make is
more general. As we know from Section 4, integration shifts the bargaining problemmore
towards inframarginal production quantities. As a consequence, suppliers incentives for
cost reduction at the margin increase, implying an increase in total output and thus
consumer rents. While the eﬀects of retailer concentration on consumer surplus may
have to be qualiÞed depending on possible monopolization eﬀects at the outlet markets,
their positive eﬀects on manufacturers investment and technology choices would still
persist. Moreover, our observation that retailer concentration may imply more eﬃcient
production runs counter to a widely held view. For the case of retailer mergers in
the grocery industry, Dobson et al. (1998) and FTC (2001)41 state that a monopsony
reduces productive eﬃciency by erasing suppliers rents.42 However, our analysis suggests
that this view has to be qualiÞed in two respects. First, retailer concentration aﬀects
diﬀerently suppliers beneÞts from various forms of cost-reduction, i.e., those aﬀecting
more infra-marginal or marginal costs. Second, from consumers perspective the latter
form of cost-reduction may matter far more, while suppliers incentives to keep down
marginal costs may in fact increase if retailers are concentrated.
41More generally, see the discussion in Blair and Harrison (1993, p. 36-43).
42A similar view is expressed in the health care market, which in many instances has become a
bilateral oligopoly in the US (see Gaynor and Haas-Wilson (1998)). Again it is feared that buyer power
may reduce quality provision by way of aﬀecting the distribution of total rents (see Pitofsky (1997)).
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We are only aware of one empirical study which tries to measure the impact of down-
stream concentration on upstream investments or technology choice. Farber (1981) Þnds
that R&D eﬀort, as measured by scientiÞc and engineering personnel, can both increase
or decrease with downstream market concentration. For further empirical studies our
results have the following two main implications. First, incentives depend much on the
type of investment decision or technology choice, i.e., in which form rents are created.
Second, as exempliÞed in Proposition 5, market structure and technology choice interact
both ways and must both be treated as endogenous.
7 Discussion
7.1 The Bargaining Procedure
We now comment on the choice of our bargaining procedure as discussed in Section
3.2. It is straightforward to show that nothing would change qualitatively if we were to
assume a diﬀerent sharing rule of (net) surplus, which is not directly aﬀected by market
structure.
If bargaining were to proceed sequentially, the distribution of payoﬀs would depend
crucially on the (artiÞcially?) chosen sequence. To see this, suppose that one side is
integrated, implying the presence of exactly three independent parties. Suppose also
that players can write rather complicated contracts, which may, for instance, specify a
penalty if one of the players subsequently negotiates with the third player. In such a
setting it is typically the case that the two players who start bargaining can extract
extremely high rents from the third party (see, for instance, Aghion and Bolton (1987),
Marx and Shaﬀer (1999), and Bernheim and Whinston (1998)). On the other side, if
the contractual set is rather constrained and may only permit a Þxed cash payment, the
outcome can be markedly diﬀerent. To see this, suppose that two suppliers with strictly
complementary goods bargain with a single retailer. Once the retailer has obtained the
Þrst good, the incremental surplus of obtaining the second good can be extremely high.
As this allows the second supplier to extract a high payment, the supplier selling Þrst
receives far less. This has been formally explored by Cai (2000).
Our results on equilibrium market structure and technology choice depend on the
fact that bargaining between two parties proceeds overproportionally on the respective
margin, i.e., over the net surplus, while the deÞnition of this margin depends on
the size of the Þrms, i.e., on being integrated or not. We conjecture that any bargaining
concept for oligopolistic industries with these features would reproduce our results. As
established in Inderst and Wey (2000b), this holds in particular for the case of simulta-
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neous Nash bargaining over simple (non-contingent) supply contracts.
7.2 Interdependent Demand at the Retail Outlets
We have so far assumed that demand at the two retailers is independent. If this is no
longer the case, the choice of the contractual set discussed above raises another issue.
Consider the case of bilateral non-integration. Under our bargaining procedure, con-
tracts between supplier s and retailer r can only condition on the set of (dis-)agreements
in the economy. With this speciÞcation contracts fail to maximize industry surplus under
interdependent demand due to opportunistic behavior in the bilateral negotiations (see
McAfee and Schwartz (1994)). Precisely, the cross-price eﬀects over the two retailers
are not taken into consideration. In this case downstream integration would have the
immediate beneÞt of monopolizing the Þnal market. Instead, if we allow for complex
arrangements where bilateral contracts can condition on the whole set of contracts in
the economy, there exists an equilibrium where the Þnal market is fully monopolized.
Intuitively, as each supplier serves all retailers in equilibrium, it is feasible to internalize
all externalities (over goods and retailers) by bilateral contracts.43 We conjecture that
our results survive qualitatively under a suitable choice of equilibrium for varying market
structures. In addition, with interdependent demand at the two retailers, we would ob-
tain new incentives for downstream integration. Indeed, the logic obtained for suppliers
in case of substitutes could now be directly applied to downstream merger incentives.
8 Conclusion
This paper makes three related contributions. First, we propose a rather natural form of
negotiations and contracting in bilateral oligopolistic industries, which happens to give
rise to the Shapley value. Second, we explore the motivations for up- and downstream
horizontal mergers if the only eﬀect of market structure is to determine the distribution
of industry proÞts. Third, we explore the interaction of market structure with technology
choice. As market structure determines howmarginal and inframarginal rents are shared,
we Þnd that (i) market structure aﬀects technology choice and that (ii) Þrms may choose
a particular organizational form in order to inßuence the technology choice of other Þrms
in the value chain. The link between market structure and technology choice provides
also a basis for regulatory interference even though market structure has no direct impact
on consumer welfare.
43These questions are addressed in the research areas of contracting with externalities and contracting
with common principals and common agents.
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The framework suggested in this paper can be easily extended beyond the considered
case of a bilateral duopoly. One interesting question would then be to ask when inte-
rior market structures which lie between full integration and full fragmentation would
arise. We conjecture that this might be the case with S-shaped cost functions. Loosely
speaking, if downstream concentration becomes so large that the supplier-retailer bar-
gaining problem reaches inframarginal production levels at which unit costs start to
decrease, further concentration should become unproÞtable.
Throughout the paper we have also been silent on the possibility of vertical mergers.
Extending both the analysis of market structure and that of technology choice to this
case seems to be a fruitful avenue for further research. For instance, one might ask
whether, starting from a non-integrated market structure, either retailers or another
supplier have more to gain frommerging with a particular target supplier to strengthen
their bargaining position. Alternatively, one could ask which market structure maximizes
suppliers incentives to decrease marginal or inframarginal costs and whether this market
structure could arise endogenously.
A further extension would be to put exogenous restrictions on the supply patterns
in the industry. For instance, we may suppose that certain Þrms (retailers) cannot
procure from certain suppliers as they have not previously invested in the necessary
infrastructure. It may be interesting to analyze how industry surplus is shared under such
restrictions. Moreover, imposing these restrictions may allow to explore new incentives
for (horizontal) mergers.44
Finally, this paper has conÞned itself to study the impact of market structure on
technology choice at a single supplier. Exploring further the idea how market structure
at one level may aﬀect investment and strategic (non-price) choices at other levels of
the value chain, the following questions arise naturally. How does downstream market
structure aﬀect the product choice of suppliers, e.g., their degree of substitutability or
complementarity? How are incentives for (not fully contractible) demand-enhancing
activities, e.g., advertising by retailers or product innovation by suppliers, determined
by the integration of suppliers or retailers respectively?
Appendix A: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1
The proof consists of the application of the Shapley value for the diﬀerent market
structures.
44Similar questions are addressed in the network literature (see Jackson andWolinsky (1996), Kranton
and Minehart (2000)).
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(i) ω = (1, 1): If both sides are integrated, the two parties share the surplus WΩ
equally.
(ii) ω = (1, 2): If only suppliers are integrated, retailer r realizes 1
3
[WΩ −WΩ\{r} +
1
2
WΩ\{r0}], where r0 6= r, while the integrated supplier realizes 13 [WΩ+ 12WΩ\{r}+ 12WΩ\{r0}].
(iii) ω = (2, 1): If only retailers are integrated, supplier s realizes 1
3
[WΩ −WΩ\{s} +
1
2
WΩ\{s0}], where s0 6= s, while the integrated retailer realizes 13 [WΩ+ 12WΩ\{s}+ 12WΩ\{s0}].
(iv) ω = (2, 2): If both sides are non-integrated, supplier s realizes
1
4
WΩ +
1
12
£
WΩ\{s0,r0} +WΩ\{s0,r} −WΩ\{s,r0} −WΩ\{s,r}
¤
+
1
12
£
WΩ\{r0} +WΩ\{r} +WΩ\{s0} −WΩ\{s}
¤
,
where s0 6= s, while retailer r realizes
1
4
WΩ +
1
12
£
WΩ\{s0,r0} +WΩ\{s0,r0} −WΩ\{s0,r} −WΩ\{s,r}
¤
+
1
12
£
WΩ\{s0} +WΩ\{s} +WΩ\{r0} − 3WΩ\{r}
¤
,
where r0 6= r.
Proof of Proposition 2
Consider Þrst the case of retailer integration. For all Ω0 ∈ {Ω,Ω\ {a} ,Ω\ {b}} denote
by xΩ
0
sr the (by (A.1) unique) quantities supplied to realize maximum industry proÞts
WΩ0. We show next that (5) holds if unit costs at both suppliers are strictly increasing.
Note that the sum of payoﬀsWΩ\{a}+WΩ\{b} does not increase if we replace the optimal
quantities xΩ\{a}sb and x
Ω\{b}
sa by the respective quantities xΩsr, which are optimal if all
Þrms participate.45 As a consequence, (5) holds ifX
s∈S0
Ks(x
Ω
sa + x
Ω
sb) >
X
s∈S0
Ks(x
Ω
sa) +
X
s∈S0
Ks(x
Ω
sb),
which follows if Ks(y+ z) > Ks(y) +Ks(z) holds for all y, z > 0 and s ∈ S0. This holds
as unit costs are by assumption strictly decreasing.46 The case of decreasing unit costs
is analogous.
Consider next the case of supplier integration with substitutes. Denote again by
xΩ
0
sr > 0 the optimal quantities for the sets Ω
0 ∈ {Ω,Ω\ {A} ,Ω\ {B}}. Note Þrst
45Given (A.1)-(A.2) this change results even in a strict decrease of payoﬀs.
46Denoting unit costs at s by κs(x) = Ks(x)/x for x > 0, Ks(y + z) > Ks(y) + Ks(z) holds
if κs(y + z) >
yκs(y)+zκs(z)
y+z , where the left-hand side does not exceed max {κs(y),κs(z)}, which by
assumption is smaller than κs(y + z).
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that prices at the chosen quantities xΩ
0
sr are strictly positive from (A.1)-(A.2), i.e., that
psr(x
Ω0
sr , x
Ω0
sr0) > 0 holds with r
0 6= r. From our deÞnition this implies that the respective
prices at s will strictly decrease if xΩ
0
sr0 is increased. We must now show that (4) holds,
which is the case if the inequality still holds after replacing xΩ\{A}Br and x
Ω\{B}
Ar by the
respective quantities xΩsr. This leads to the requirementX
r∈R0
£
pAr(x
Ω
Ar, 0)x
Ω
Ar + pBr(0, x
Ω
Ar)x
Ω
Br
¤
>
X
r∈R0
£
pAr(x
Ω
Ar, x
Ω
Br)x
Ω
Ar + pBr(x
Ω
Br, x
Ω
Ar)x
Ω
Br
¤
,
which holds by the deÞnition of substitutes. The argument for complements is again
analogous, which completes the proof.
Derivation of Condition (6)
We show below that (A.2) holds for the linear case with substitutes if
1− ks > c(1− ks0) + 2
p
Fs (7)
is satisÞed for s0 6= s. Substituting the speciÞcations for ks and Fs for the technology
regimes α, β, we obtain the two requirements
c < 1−∆k,
c <
1− 2√∆F
1−∆k ,
which give rise to (6). To derive (7) from (A.2), note Þrst that our linear case exhibits
non-increasing unit costs at both suppliers. Hence, with substitutes the additional sur-
plus of an additional retailer-supplier link eser is smallest if the initial link structure is
L = {(s, a), (s, b)}; i.e., if previously only supplies of the other good s were feasible. To
maximize industry proÞts, xsa and xsb are both equal to (1 − ks)/2 > 0. Given these
supplies, the optimal (additional) supply of xeser maximizes
(1− xes − c1− ks
2
− kes)xes − Fes − cxes1− ks
2
. (8)
Maximizing (8) yields a positive value for xeser, whenever 1− c− kes + cks > 0, while the
maximum additional surplus (8) is positive if 1− kes > c(1− ks) + 2√Fes.
Proof of Lemma 2
For a given technology i ∈ {α, β} the payoﬀ, Uωi of the supplier commanding over
production of goodA under a particular market structures, ω, is derived form the Shapley
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value formula, which yields in the general case
U1,1i =
1
2
W iΩ,
U1,2i =
1
3
(W iΩ +W
i
Ω{\r}),
U2,1i =
1
3
(W iΩ −W iΩ\{A} +
1
2
W iΩ\{B}),
U2,2i =
1
12
(3W iΩ + 2W
i
Ω\{B,r) − 2W iΩ\{A,r} + 2W iΩ\{r} +W iΩ\{B} − 3W iΩ\{A}),
whereW iΩ0 is the industry proÞt for a coalition Ω
0 ⊆ Ω, when technology i is chosen. For
the linear case, we derive the following values for W iΩ0 :
W iΩ =
1
2
(1− kα)2 + (1− ki)2 − 2c(1− kα)(1− ki)
1− c2 − F
i − Fα,
W iΩ\{r} =
1
4
(1− kα)2 + (1− ki)2 − 2c(1− kα)(1− ki)
1− c2 − F
i − Fα,
W iΩ\{A} =
(1− kα)2
2
− Fα,
W iΩ\{B} =
(1− ki)2
2
− F i,
W iΩ\{B,r} =
(1− ki)2
4
− F i,
W iΩ\{A,r} =
(1− kα)2
4
− Fα.
The thresholds ∆ωF are now obtained by setting U
ω
β = U
ω
α .
Proof of Proposition 4
Social welfare is given by SW i =
P
r∈R0 u(x
i
A,r, x
i
B,r)−KiA(xiA,r + xiA,r0)−KαB(xαB,r +
xαB,r0), with i ∈ I, where xis,r indicates the respective supply of good s at retailer r if
technology i is chosen, andK is(·) stands for the total costs of supplier s under technology
i . Recall that these quantities are chosen so as to maximize industry proÞts. We obtain
SWα =
3 (1− kα)2
2(1 + c)
− 2Fα,
SW β =
3
4
µ
2(1− kα −∆k)(1− kα)
(1 + c)
+
(∆k)
2
(1− c2)
¶
− 2Fα +∆F .
Comparison of SWα and SW β yields the threshold value ∆∗F = 3Γ for a welfare im-
proving adoption of technology i = β. Comparison with ∆2,1F shows that ∆
∗
F −∆2,1F > 0
holds if
∆k < e∆k ≡ 2(3− 5c+ 2c2)
3− 10c+ 2c2 .
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As ∆k < 1− c holds by (6), while it holds that e∆k > 1− c, it follows that ∆∗F > ∆2,1F .
Proof of Proposition 5
As argued in the main text, it is immediate that suppliers must be integrated. It
thus remains to consider the choice between ω = (1, 1) and ω = (1, 2). For ∆F < ∆
1,2
F
and ∆F > ∆
1,2
F it was already argued in the main text that the assertions follow from
the analysis of Section 4. Consider thus the remaining interval where ∆F ∈ (∆1,2F ,∆1,1F ).
In this case Proposition 3 implies that technology α is chosen under ω = (1, 2) and
technology β is the optimal technology choice under ω = (1, 1). Hence, retailers joint
payoﬀ under market structure ω = (1, 1) and technology i = β becomes
1
4
(1− kα)2 + (1− kβ)2 − 2c(1− kα)(1− kβ)
1− c2 −
1
2
(Fα + F β), (9)
while they realize
1
3
(1− kα)2 + (1− kα)2 − 2c(1− kα)(1− kα)
1− c2 (10)
− 1
12
(1− kα)2 + (1− kα)2 − 2c(1− kα)(1− kα)
1− c2
under market structure ω = (1, 2) when technology i = α is chosen. The assertion for
∆F ∈ (∆1,2F ,∆1,1F ) holds whenever (9)>(10), which transforms to the requirement
∆F > e∆F ≡ ∆k [2(1− c)−∆k(1− 2c)]
2(1− c2) .
Using∆k < 1−c from (6), it follows that e∆F is strictly decreasing in∆k. It thus remains
to show that ∆F > e∆F holds at the lower boundary of the considered interval, where
∆F = ∆
1,2
F =
3
2
(1
4
∆k
1−c2 (2(1−c)(1−∆k)+∆k)). At this point ∆F > e∆F transforms to the
requirement c < 2−∆k
2(1−∆k) . As
2−∆k
2(1−∆k) > 1, this holds by (6) and ∆k > 0, which completes
the proof.
Appendix B: Formalization of the Bargaining Proce-
dure
To formalize the bargaining procedure described in Section 3.2 we need some additional
notation. Denote the set of independent suppliers by Σ and that of retailers by Π.
For instance, if suppliers are non-integrated, we obtain Σ = {A,B}. All parties to the
negotiations are summarized in the set Ψ = Σ ∪ Π. The set of feasible contingencies is
denoted by PΣ,Π, which is equal to the power set of Σ × Π. For instance, if integrated
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suppliers bargain with non-integrated retailers, PΣ,Π contains the three contingencies
{(AB, a)}, {(AB, b)}, and {(AB, a), (AB, b)}, where the last contingency consists of the
two links p = (AB, a) and p = (AB, b). For each contingency P ∈ PΣ,Π we need to
specify transfers and supplied quantities for all involved parties. Given some p ∈ P with
p = (σ, π), where σ ∈ Σ and π ∈ Π, agreed transfers from π to σ are denoted by t Pp .
Regarding quantities, note that π and σ may negotiate over the supply of more than
one good to more than one outlet if at least one of the two parties is integrated. To
reduce the amount of notation, we write s ∈ σ (r ∈ π) if the possibly integrated supplier
σ (retailer π) commands over outlet s ∈ S0 (r ∈ R0). Hence, π and σ determine all
quantities x Psr where s ∈ σ and r ∈ π. Finally, we denote the payoﬀ of some ψ ∈ Ψ
under contingency P ∈ PΣ,Π by U Pψ .
We are now in the position to formalize our equilibrium requirements i)-iii). The
derivation of equilibrium contracts and payoﬀs for some market structure ω with inde-
pendent Þrms Σ and Π proceeds iteratively on the set of possible contingencies PΣ,Π. We
denote the respective equilibrium contracts and payoﬀs by x P,∗sr , t
P ,∗
p , and U
P ,∗
ψ , and set
the expressions equal to zero for all contingencies P which do not contain the respective
links or parties, i.e., t P,∗p = 0 if p /∈ P , x P ,∗sr = 0 if there is no (σ, π) ∈ P satisfying s ∈ σ
and r ∈ π, and U P,∗ψ = 0 if there is no (σ, π) ∈ P satisfying σ = ψ or π = ψ. For all
contingencies P ∈ PΣ,Π the following conditions must hold.
1) Optimality: For all p ∈ P the quantities x P,∗sr , with p = (σ,π), s ∈ σ, and r ∈ π,
solve the problem
max
xsr with s∈σ,r∈π
(X
r∈π
[pAr(xAr, xBr)xAr + pBr(xBr, xAr)xBr]−
X
s∈σ
Ks(xsa + xsb)
)
,
where xs0r0 = x
P,∗,
s0r0 in case s
0 /∈ σ or r0 /∈ π.
2) Net surplus sharing: For all p ∈ P transfers t P ,∗p are chosen to achieve equal
sharing of net surplus between the two parties σ and π, where p = (σ, π), i.e., it holds
that
U
P
σ − U P\{(σ,π)}π = U Pσ − U P\{(σ,π)}π .
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